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Circuit Judges 
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East Rutherford, NJ 07073 
 Appellant, pro se 
 
Gary S. Lipshutz, Esquire 
Emelia Perez, Esquire (argued) 
City of Newark, Department of Law  
920 Broad Street  
Newark, NJ 07102 
 Counsel for Appellee City of Newark 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 
 Gregory Meditz (“Meditz”), an attorney proceeding 
pro se, appeals from the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the City of Newark (“Newark”) on his 
claim of disparate impact and his motion to strike
1
 an exhibit 
                                                 
1
 Before the District Court, Meditz sought to strike a 
certification attached to Newark‟s reply brief.  The District 
Court denied this motion, concluding that the information 
contained in the certification was publicly available, that 
Meditz was aware of the information, and that the “contents 
are unnecessary to decide the present summary judgment 
motion, and have in no way altered this Court‟s decision.”  
(App. 4.)  We review the District Court‟s decision denying 
 3 
 
attached to Newark‟s reply brief.  Meditz alleges that the 
residency requirement adopted by Newark for its non-
uniformed work force has a disparate impact on white, non-
Hispanics because Newark‟s population does not reflect the 
racial make-up of the relevant labor market in the surrounding 
area.  As a result, white, non-Hispanics are under-represented 
in Newark‟s non-uniformed work force.   For the reasons set 
forth below, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment 
on the disparate impact claim was not appropriate based on 
this record.  We will therefore reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. Facts/background 
 In April 2007, Meditz, a white male, applied for the 
position of Housing Development Analyst in Newark.  He 
was rejected in July 2007 because, at the time, he lived in 
Rutherford, New Jersey.
2
  Newark has a residency 
                                                                                                             
the motion to strike for an abuse of discretion.  See In re: Fine 
Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 603, 604 (3d Cir. 1984).  “A 
district court abuses its discretion if its decision rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 
or an improper application of law to fact.”  Johnston v. HBO 
Film Management, Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2001).  
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion to strike since we find no 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law, or 
improper application of law to fact.  
 
2
 Meditz now lives in East Rutherford, New Jersey. 
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requirement for non-uniformed employees.
3
  In light of the 
                                                 
3
  Newark‟s ordinance setting forth its residency 
requirements provides that: 
 
All officers and employees of the City 
who shall hereafter become employees of the 
City are hereby required as a condition of their 
continued employment to have their place of 
abode in the City and to be bona fide residents 
therein, except as otherwise provided by the 
Charter.  A bona fide resident, for the purpose 
of this section, is a person having a permanent 
domicile within the City and one which has not 
been adopted with the intention of again taking 
up or claiming a previous residence acquired 
outside of the City limits.  
 
The Director of any Department or the 
Mayor or City Clerk is hereby authorized in 
his/her discretion, for good cause shown, to 
permit any officer or employee of the City in 
his/her respective department or office to 
remain in the employ of the City without 
complying with the provisions hereof, where: 
 
 a.  The health of any officer or 
employee necessitated residence outside of the 
City limits; 
 
 b.  The nature of the employment 
is such as to require residence outside of the 
City limits; 
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waiver provisions in the ordinance, 185 non-uniformed 
employees
4
 reside outside of Newark, in 82
5
 different 
municipalities, including some in other states.  Uniformed 
employees must reside in Newark during their preliminary 
training, but then can move out of the city. 
 In support of his prima facie case, Meditz provided 
detailed statistical information in opposition to Newark‟s 
motion for summary judgment.  Meditz obtained the 
                                                                                                             
 
 c.  Special talent or technique 
which is necessary for the operation of 
government not found among Newark residents 
exists justifying residence outside of the City 
limits; 
 
Failure of any officer or employee to 
comply with this section shall be cause for 
his/her removal or discharge from the City 
service.  
 
NEWARK, N.J. REV. ORDINANCES § 2:24-1.1. 
 
4
 Newark has 4,316 employees, of which 1,949 are 
non-uniformed and 2,367 are uniformed.  Currently, 185 non-
uniformed employees reside outside the city and 805 
uniformed employees reside outside the city. 
 
5
 The parties disagree as to the number of different 
municipalities in which Newark employees live.  This 
difference is not material to the underlying issues in this case.   
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statistical information from publicly available reports.  
Newark does not dispute the validity of any of the statistics 
Meditz presented.  These statistics compared the ethnic 
distribution of non-uniformed employees to the ethnic make-
up of Newark.
6 
 Meditz argued that the difference between the 
percentages of white, non-Hispanic non-uniformed and 
uniformed employees was based on the residency requirement 
for non-uniformed employees.  That is, Meditz posited that 
the residency requirement for non-uniformed employees was 
negatively impacting the hiring of white, non-Hispanics.   
 Newark argues that the statistics presented by Meditz 
do not support his prima facie case, since “the statistical 
disparities are not sufficiently substantial as to show that the 
residency ordinance has caused whites of non-Hispanic origin 
to be excluded from jobs with [Newark] because of their 
race.”  (Br. of Def.-Appellee City of Newark 10.) 
 Alleging that the relevant labor market was the six 
county area surrounding Newark, Meditz also provided the 
ethnic breakdown of the general population in the 
surrounding counties, all of which included higher 
percentages of white, non-Hispanics than were employed as 
non-uniformed employees in Newark.
7
  He included more 
                                                 
6
  In 2007, 9.24% of the non-uniformed employees in 
Newark were white, non-Hispanic, while 28.31% of the 
uniformed employees were white, non-Hispanic.  According 
to the 2000 census data, 14.2% of Newark‟s general 
population is white, non-Hispanic.   
     
7
  The six counties Meditz examined were Bergen, 
Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, and Union.  Based on the 
2000 census data, the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in 
 7 
 
specific data addressing the ethnic composition of 
government employees
8
 and the private labor force
9
 in each 
of the surrounding counties.  The percentage of white, non-
Hispanics in these positions greatly exceeded the number of 
white, non-Hispanics in Newark‟s non-uniformed work force.  
Meditz also provided employment statistics for Essex County 
governmental employees.  Essex County has its county seat in 
Newark, and the composition of the Essex County and 
Newark non-uniformed workforces are comparable with 
regard to skill level and job function.  Of the non-uniformed 
county workforce, 42.96% is white, non-Hispanic, according 
to the 2008 EEO-4 report.  Meditz argued that the lower 
                                                                                                             
Bergen County‟s general population is 72.3%; in Essex 
County‟s general population is 37.6%; in Hudson County‟s 
general population is 35.3%; in Morris County‟s general 
population is 82.0%; in Passaic County‟s general population 
is 51.5%; and in Union County‟s general population is 54.2%. 
    
8
 Based on data gathered from 2005 Equal 
Employment Opportunity reports, the percentage of white, 
non-Hispanic government employees in Bergen County is 
86.49%; in Essex County is 48.09%; in Hudson County is 
48.09%; in Morris County is 84.37%; in Passaic County is 
56.3%; and in Union County is 66.2%. 
 
9
 Based on data gathered from 2005 Equal 
Employment Opportunity reports, the percentage of white, 
non-Hispanic employees in the private labor force in Bergen 
County is 55.18%; in Essex County is 46.05%; in Hudson 
County is 43.05%; in Morris County is 65.77%; in Passaic 
County is 50.24%; and in Union County is 53.31%. 
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percentage of white, non-Hispanic non-uniformed employees 
in Newark was caused by the residency requirement, and that 
absent a residency requirement, significantly more white, 
non-Hispanics would be employed by Newark. As a result, 
Meditz concluded that Newark‟s residency requirement 
disparately impacted him as a white, non-Hispanic who was 
denied a job with Newark.   
 The District Court granted Newark‟s motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that Meditz failed to prove 
his prima facie case.  That is, based on the statistical evidence 
Meditz presented, the District Court concluded that “these 
statistics, standing alone, do not constitute sufficient evidence 
of a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.”  In re Meditz 
v. City of Newark, No. 08-2912, 2010 WL 1529612, at *3 
(D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2010).  The District Court further concluded 
that there was no need to look beyond Newark‟s borders to 
define the relevant labor market, since “Newark is New 
Jersey‟s largest city with over 270,000 residents, 38,950 of 
whom are White.  Given its diversity and large population, 
there is no need to redefine the relevant labor market past city 
limits for purposes of Title VII analysis.”  Id. at *4.  We 
disagree with both conclusions of the District Court.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331; we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
 10
   
                                                 
10
 Meditz‟s Third Amended Complaint asserts seven 
counts.  He avers constitutional claims, pursuant to both the 
federal and state constitutions, as well as a claim of disparate 
treatment.  Meditz does not appeal the District Court‟s 
 9 
 
 We review the District Court‟s order granting 
summary judgment de novo. Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat‟l 
Ass‟n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  ATo that end, we are 
required to apply the same test the district court should have 
utilized initially.@  Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Summary judgment is appropriate Awhere the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 
and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.@  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                             
decision granting summary judgment on those claims.  
Additionally, the Third Amended Complaint included claims 
made pursuant to New Jersey‟s Open Public Records Act and 
the common law right to access to public records (counts 6 
and 7).  Newark did not seek summary judgment on these 
claims.  In its opinion, the District Court noted that it 
appeared that Meditz obtained the records he sought.  
However, the District Court did not dismiss these claims as 
moot.  While both parties treated the District Court‟s order as 
final, the failure to address all counts of the complaint causes 
us to question the finality of the District Court‟s order, and 
thus our jurisdiction.  However, our review of the entire 
record assures us that the records referenced in counts 6 and 7 
of the Third Amended Complaint were, in fact, provided to 
Meditz, since several of his exhibits cite those records, thus 
rendering those claims moot.  Ultimately, the failure to 
address counts 6 and 7 does not undermine either the District 
Court‟s ruling or our jurisdiction. 
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2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
11
  AOnce the 
moving party points to evidence demonstrating no issue of 
material fact exists, the non-moving party has the duty to set 
forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its 
favor.@  Azur, 601 F.3d at 216.  In determining whether 
summary judgment is warranted A[t]he evidence of the 
nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are 
to be drawn in his favor.@  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chambers ex rel. Chambers, 587 
F.3d at 181.  AFurther, „[w]e may affirm the District Court‟s 
order granting summary judgment on any grounds supported 
by the record.‟@  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d at 805). 
III.  Analysis  
 Meditz claims that Newark‟s residency requirement 
for non-uniformed employees has a disparate impact on 
white, non-Hispanics in violation of Title VII.  In support of 
his claim, he cites evidence of the relatively low percentage 
of white, non-Hispanics in Newark‟s non-uniformed work 
force.  The statistics he provides demonstrate that the 
percentage of white, non-Hispanics in Newark‟s non-
uniformed work force is lower than the percentage that would 
be anticipated based on the percentage of white, non-
                                                 
11
  FED. R. CIV. P. 56 was revised in 2010.  The 
standard previously set forth in subsection (c) is now codified 
as subsection (a).  The language of this subsection is 
unchanged, except for “one word — genuine „issue‟ bec[ame] 
genuine „dispute.‟”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee‟s 
note, 2010 amend. 
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Hispanics in the population of the relevant labor market.     
 Title VII makes it unlawful “to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual‟s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that Title VII plaintiffs can make out a viable 
employment discrimination claim without alleging or proving 
discriminatory intent.  See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 
424 (1971).  Under Title VII, “practices, procedures, or tests 
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, 
cannot be maintained if they operate to „freeze‟ the status quo 
of prior discriminatory employment practices.”  Griggs, 401 
U.S. at 430.   
 “The [Supreme] Court announced that these „disparate 
impact‟ cases should proceed in two steps: (1) the plaintiff 
must prove that the challenged policy discriminates against 
members of a protected class, and then (2) the defendant can 
overcome the showing of disparate impact by proving a 
„manifest relationship‟ between the policy and job 
performance. This second step came to be known as the 
„business necessity‟ defense, and it serves as an employer‟s 
only means of defeating a Title VII claim when its 
employment policy has a discriminatory effect.”  El v. 
SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnotes 
omitted.)  “[T]he successful assertion of the business 
necessity defense is not an ironclad shield; rather, the plaintiff 
can overcome it by showing that an alternative policy exists 
that would serve the employer‟s legitimate goals as well as 
the challenged policy with less of a discriminatory effect.”  
Id. at 240 n.9.   
 12 
 
 Thus, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff is required to 
demonstrate that application of a facially neutral standard has 
resulted in a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.”  
N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 798 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977)). 
“The evidence in these „disparate impact‟ cases usually 
focuses on statistical disparities.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).   “A comparison 
between the racial composition of those qualified persons in 
the relevant labor market and that of those in the jobs at issue 
typically „forms the proper basis for the initial inquiry in a 
disparate impact case.‟”  Harrison, 940 F.2d at 798 (quoting 
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-
51(1989) (superceded by statute on other grounds)). 
 The Supreme Court has noted in several cases that 
statistics may serve to establish plaintiff‟s prima facie case.  
See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 991-95; Hazelwood School 
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S 299 (1977).  That is, “[w]here 
gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a 
proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or 
practice of discrimination.”  Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08.  
But, “[o]nce the employment practice at issue has been 
identified, causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff must 
offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to 
show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of 
applicants for jobs or promotions because of their 
membership in a protected group. Our formulations, which 
have never been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical 
formula, have consistently stressed that statistical disparities 
must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an 
inference of causation.”  Watson, 487 U.S. 994-95.  See also 
 13 
 
Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(observing that “[t]he [Supreme] Court held that the plaintiff 
may not make out a prima facie discrimination case simply by 
showing a bottom line racial imbalance in the work force, or 
by identifying a number of allegedly discriminatory 
employment practices. Instead, the plaintiff must 
„demonstrate that the [racial] disparity . . . is the result of one 
or more of the employment practices that they are attacking 
. . ., specifically showing that each challenged practice has a 
significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities 
for whites and nonwhites.‟” (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 
at 657)).   
 However, a key factor in assessing the statistics is 
ensuring that the court is using the correct basis for 
comparison.  That is, “[w]hat the hiring figures prove 
obviously depends upon the figures to which they are 
compared.”  Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 310.12  To use the 
vernacular, we cannot compare apples to oranges.  In 
Hazelwood, that was essentially what the district court did — 
it compared the percentage of minority teachers to the 
percentage of minority students, rather than comparing the 
                                                 
12
 The Supreme Court commented that there are cases 
where comparing the work force to the general population 
would be appropriate, such as cases involving unskilled labor.  
However, “[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill 
particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather 
than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the 
necessary qualifications) may have little probative value.”  
Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13.  See also Green v. USX 
Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 804-05 (3d Cir. 1990) (using applicant 
flow data for unskilled positions acceptable). 
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percentage of minority teachers in the Hazelwood school 
district to the percentage of minority teachers in the relevant 
labor market.  The Supreme Court directed the district court, 
on remand, to evaluate the parameters of the appropriate 
“relevant labor market,” including whether it should or should 
not include the city of St. Louis.  The Court, after discussing 
statistical methodology, commented that those “observations 
are not intended to suggest that precise calculations of 
statistical significance are necessary in employing statistical 
proof, but merely to highlight the importance of the choice of 
the relevant labor market area.”  Id. at 311. 
 Similarly, we have addressed the question of what 
constitutes the relevant labor market.  In Harrison, the Third 
Circuit examined Harrison‟s employment related residency 
requirement, and that policy‟s impact on the city‟s ability to 
hire minorities.  Given that the city of Harrison had a very 
small minority population, limiting hiring to city residents 
almost assured having no minority employees.  However, that 
fact alone was insufficient to establish plaintiff‟s prima facie 
case.  In Harrison, we approved the District Court‟s 
methodology for defining the relevant labor market.  The 
factors included geographical location, flow of transportation 
facilities, locations from which private employers in Harrison 
draw their work force, and commuting patterns.  940 F.2d at 
799-801. 
 Here, in support of his prima facie case, Meditz 
offered statistical evidence showing that the percentage of 
white, non-Hispanics employed by Newark was lower than 
the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in the general 
population of Newark.  Meditz also offered statistics showing 
the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in surrounding areas, 
both for the general population and for the private and 
 15 
 
government work forces.  Finally, Meditz offered evidence of 
the percentage of white, non-Hispanics employed by the 
Essex County government in Newark.  Out of all of these 
percentages, the lowest was the percentage of white, non-
Hispanics employed by the city of Newark.  This compilation 
of statistics supported Meditz‟s claim that white, non-
Hispanics were under-represented in Newark‟s non-
uniformed work force.   
 The Supreme Court has set forth standards to be used 
as a basis for evaluating statistical evidence in disparate 
impact claims.  Relying on the statistical standards developed 
in jury analysis cases, the Supreme Court suggested that 
“fluctuation of more than two or three standard deviations 
would undercut the hypothesis that decisions were being 
made randomly with respect to race.”  Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 
at 311 n.17.
13
  Assuming for the moment that the District 
                                                 
13
  “The measure of the predicted fluctuations from the 
expected value is the standard deviation.”  Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17.  “A standard deviation 
analysis would proceed as follows: Creating a jury list would 
be similar hypothetically to stocking a shelf with 100 pens 
randomly selected from a batch of 1000 pens, 700 of which 
are blue and 300 of which are red. The expected number of 
blue pens would be 700 x .1 or 70 pens and the expected 
number of red pens would be 300 x .1 or 30 pens. However, 
there is a certain probability that random selection would 
yield a different result. The standard deviation calculation 
measures how likely it is that a deviant result occurred by 
chance. In the above example, the standard deviation is the 
square root of the product of the number of pens shelved 
(100) times the probability of drawing a red pen (0.3) times 
 16 
 
Court was correct and the relevant labor market is the 
population of the city of Newark, the difference between the 
two percentages is slightly over six standard deviations, far in 
excess of the Supreme Court‟s suggested standard of two or 
three standard deviations.
14
  This difference appears to 
establish a prima facie case.
15
     
                                                                                                             
the probability of drawing a blue pen (0.7). Here, that number 
is 4.6 pens. Each standard deviation results in a substantially 
reduced probability that the result occurred by random 
chance. In our example, the probability that 20 red “pens and 
80 blue pens would be randomly shelved is less than 5 
percent.”  Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1232 n.17 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
14
 Using the percentage of white, non-Hispanic 
government employees in Essex County results in a 
difference of slightly over 34 standard deviations.  Our use of 
the Essex County government employees figure does not 
reflect any view on the composition of the relevant labor 
market.     
 
15
 “[A] plaintiff must also prove causation. . . . „As a 
general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the 
application of a specific or particular employment practice 
that has created the disparate impact under attack. Such a 
showing is an integral part of the plaintiff's prima facie case 
in a disparate-impact suit under Title VII.‟”  N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Wards 
Cove, 490 U.S. at 657).  In Bayonne, the court noted that 
“[c]ausation presents a question of fact.”  Id. at 119.  The 
District Court never discussed the issue of causation since it 
 17 
 
 Despite this statistical evidence, the District Court 
concluded that Meditz failed to prove his prima facie case 
because the difference between the percentage of white, non-
Hispanics employed by the city (9.24%) compared to the 
percentage of white, non-Hispanics living in the city (14.2%), 
did “not constitute sufficient evidence of a significantly 
discriminatory hiring pattern.”  Meditz, 2010 WL 1529612, at 
*3.  Given this bald conclusion, it is not clear what 
methodology or statistical analysis the District Court 
employed.  Notably, the District Court made no reference to 
the standard deviation analysis recommended by the Supreme 
Court.  
   Before the District Court can reach the statistical 
analysis, it must make a determination as to the parameters of 
                                                                                                             
concluded that the statistics did not support Meditz‟s claim.  
Here, Meditz is challenging a residency requirement.  In such 
a case, if the geographic limits of the relevant labor market 
are the same as those imposed by the residency requirement, 
then comparison between the racial composition of the 
relevant labor market and the racial composition of the 
employer‟s workforce will not necessarily explain causation.  
Any statistically significant disparity between the two 
populations most likely will not be the result of the residency 
requirement because all members of the relevant labor market 
would meet the requirement.  Put differently, if every person 
that the employer could reasonably recruit (i.e., the relevant 
labor market) meets the residency requirement, then the 
requirement can have no effect—racial or otherwise—on the 
employer‟s hiring.  Therefore, comparison to other factors 
will be necessary in order to demonstrate causation.  
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the relevant labor market.  See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 313.  
In conducting this analysis, the District Court should consider 
the factors set forth in Harrison, including geographical 
location, flow of transportation facilities, locations from 
which private employers draw their workforce, and 
commuting patterns.
16
  Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799-801.   
 In Harrison, this Court concluded that the factors 
considered by the district court in determining what 
geographical area constituted the relevant labor market were 
reasonable.  940 F.2d at 801.  The District Court here focused 
on the fact that the population of Harrison, at the time of this 
Court‟s decision in that case, included few blacks, and 
Harrison employed no blacks.  By comparison, according to 
the District Court here, the fact that Newark employed 180 
                                                 
16
 In support of his proposed definition of the relevant 
labor market, Meditz offered his own affidavit stating that the 
“City of Newark is within reasonable commuting distance to 
Essex, Bergen, Hudson, Union, Morris & Passaic counties,” 
and that his current residence, East Rutherford, was only 
seven miles from the City of Newark.  Additionally, he 
offered employment data obtained from Newark, which 
showed that, due to waivers of the residency requirement, 185 
of Newark‟s 1,949 non-uniformed employees resided outside 
of the City of Newark.  Finally, the government of the County 
of Essex—an employer similar in many respects to the City 
of Newark—has an office in Newark but does not require its 
employees to be residents of Newark.  Newark has not 
contested any of these factual assertions.  This evidence 
strongly suggests that the relevant labor market is not limited 
to the City of Newark. 
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white, non-Hispanics, far more than Harrison‟s employment 
of zero blacks, sufficed to demonstrate a lack of 
discrimination. 
 The District Court misinterpreted Harrison.  Rather 
than reading Harrison as setting forth appropriate criteria to 
consider in determining the relevant labor market, the District 
Court read Harrison to stand for the proposition that the only 
reason to look outside the city limits is a lack of minorities 
within the city.   
 We will remand so that the District Court can 
determine the relevant labor market, relying on the criteria set 
forth in Harrison, and then conduct a complete and correct 
statistical analysis,
17
 comparing the makeup of Newark‟s non-
uniformed labor force with the similarly skilled labor force in 
the relevant labor market.   
 To the extent the District Court concluded that, even if 
Meditz established a prima facie claim of disparate impact, 
Newark is still entitled to summary judgment because the city 
has met the requirements of the business necessity defense, 
we further reverse the Court on this point.  We agree with 
Meditz that the District Court applied the incorrect standard.   
 The District Court focused only on whether the 
business justifications offered by Newark had any connection 
                                                 
17
  The statistical analysis should include the 
calculation of the standard deviation between the number of 
white, non-Hispanics employed by Newark, and the number 
of white, non-Hispanics in the relevant labor market, rather 
than a subjective view of the relative percentages.   
 
 20 
 
to the residency policy even if unrelated to Meditz‟s ability to 
perform the job in question.  The District Court mistakenly 
relied on this court‟s opinion in Harrison that in turn relied on 
the Supreme Court‟s definition of business justification in 
Wards Cove.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 abrogated the 
decision in Wards Cove, and returned the business necessity 
defense to the standard that existed prior to the date of the 
decision in Wards Cove.  El, 479 F.3d at 241.   
 Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
we have not had the occasion to consider the business 
necessity defense in a case involving a challenge to an 
employment related residency requirement.  However, in El, 
we carefully considered the evolution of the business 
necessity defense, and concluded “that hiring criteria must 
effectively measure the „minimum qualifications for 
successful performance of the job in question.‟  This holding 
reflects the Griggs/Albemarle/Dothard rejection of criteria 
that are overbroad or merely general, unsophisticated 
measures of a legitimate job-related quality.  It is also 
consistent with the fact that Congress continues to call the test 
„business necessity,‟ not „business convenience‟ or some 
other weaker term.”  El, 479 F.3d at 242 (quoting  Lanning v. 
SEPTA, 181 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 It is this standard, and not the standard set forth in 
Harrison, that the District Court must address on remand.  We 
note that even under the “diluted”18 business necessity 
                                                 
18
  “Although Wards Cove arguably diluted the 
business necessity burden imposed upon the defendant under 
prior case law, it did not reduce the defendant‟s burden to a 
showing of mere rationality.  While it is now clear that the 
employer need not show that a challenged practice is 
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defense applied in Harrison, this Court found the reasons 
proffered by the city of Harrison to be “insubstantial” and not 
“supported by objective evidence demonstrating a nexus 
between [the] residency ordinance and any specific 
employment goal.”  Harrison, 940 F.2d at 805.  The business 
necessities we rejected in Harrison are strikingly similar to 
the justifications offered by Newark here.  Unlike the city of 
Harrison, which offered testimony in support of its business 
necessity defense, Newark provides scant support or 
explanation for its proffered business necessities.  On remand, 
if the District Court reaches the question of business 
necessity, it should analyze the evidence offered by Newark 
in support of its position, and not simply conclude that “[t]his 
Court is satisfied that Defendant has objectively demonstrated 
a nexus between its residency ordinance and its employment 
goals.”  Meditz, 2010 WL 1529612, at *4. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that 
summary judgment was not appropriate on this record.  
Factual issues exist as to how to define the appropriate 
relevant labor market.  Even if the city of Newark itself is the 
relevant labor market, the District Court erred in its statistical 
analysis.  Further, the District Court applied the incorrect 
standard when analyzing the business necessity defense.  On 
remand, the correct standard should be considered.  We will 
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
                                                                                                             
absolutely necessary, it must demonstrate that the practice 
furthers legitimate business goals.”  Harrison, 940 F.2d at 803 
(citations omitted, emphasis in original).   
